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Who are the trustworthy, we think? 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
A representative Swedish sample was asked to judge the relative trustworthiness of people 
from different groups, characterized by several dimensions such as political views and reading 
habits. A significant similarity effect was found in each of the seven dimensions analyzed. For 
example, rightwing voters consider Social Democratic voters to be much less trustworthy than 
rightwing voters, and vice versa. Thus, perceived trustworthiness appears to decrease 
generally with social distance, for which social identity theory offers a plausible explanation. 
Moreover, people who are old and live in small cities are generally considered more 
trustworthy than young people living in big cities. The results suggest reasons behind 
discrimination other than those underlying taste-based and statistical discrimination. 
 
Key words: social capital; trustworthiness; social distance; in-group bias; social identity; self-
signaling; discrimination 
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1. Introduction 
 
Society depends on trust between people in order to function well in many different ways (see 
e.g. Arrow 1972, Fukuyama 1995, and Seabright 2004). From an individual point of view, 
however, it is less clear that increased trust is beneficial since it depends on whether others 
will exploit the vulnerability that is associated with trusting someone. On the other hand, it is 
always beneficial for an individual to be perceived trustworthy, whether he actually is 
trustworthy or not. Obvious real life examples include the chance to borrow money, sell a 
used car, and get a job. It is therefore important to analyze whom people in general consider 
to be more and less trustworthy, which is the task of this paper. In order to fulfill that task, we 
simply asked a representative sample in Sweden explicit questions about the relative extent to 
which they consider people belonging to different groups to be trustworthy.  
Most other survey-based economic research on trust otherwise focuses on differences 
in the extent to which people trust others in general (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, 
Slemrod and Katuscak 2005) or particular public institutions or on these issues in light of 
corresponding implications such as differences in countries’ growth rates (e.g. Knack and 
Keefer 1997, Zak and Knack 2001), but not on differences in the extent to which different 
kinds of people are considered trustworthy. Based on the so-called trust (or investment) game 
(Berg et al., 1995), several studies in the experimental literature have with mixed results1 
                                               
1
 Studies that found no significant differences in the levels of trust, as measured by the amount sent in the trust 
game, include Glaeser et al. (2000), analysing race and nationality in a US student sample, Willinger et al. 
(2003) between French and German students, Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004) between Belgian-origin and 
Turkish-origin business men, and Johansson-Stenman et al. (2008) between Hindus and Muslims in Bangladesh. 
On the other hand, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) found a mistrust of men of Eastern origin among Jewish Israeli 
students, and Fersthman et al. (2005) found that Flemish and Walloon students in Belgium trusted each other less 
than they trusted students of their own group and that students at an ultra-orthodox institution in Israel trusted 
students from a secular institution less than students from another ultra-orthodox institution, and vice versa. 
Buchan and Croson (2004) found in a hypothetical trust experiment that students in the US and China would 
send much more to close relatives or students they knew well in comparison to unknown students or strangers. 
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investigated whether trust depends on the social distance between people.2 However, there is 
increasing skepticism about the extent to which trust games really measure trust (see e.g. Cox 
2004, Johansson-Stenman et al. 2005 and 2006, Karlan 2005, and Schechter 2007). Moreover, 
and more fundamentally, what we are interested in here is not trust but perceived 
trustworthiness. The distinction is important since I may trust another person because I 
believe that he or she (e.g. one’s spouse or close friend) will behave particularly trustworthy 
towards me. A Hells Angels member Adam may trust another member Bill more than he 
trusts Carl who is not a member, but at the same time realize that Bill is generally less 
trustworthy than Carl.  
Moreover, even among anonymous people, the degree of trustworthiness may differ 
depending on some observed characteristics of the trusting person. Consider for example the 
situation where a person is looking for a job. The personnel will not judge whether the 
applicant will be trustworthy towards them personally, but will rather try to judge whether he 
or she is a trustworthy person in general and hence suitable for the firm to employ. The same 
applies when a person would like to borrow money from a bank. It should be obvious then 
that observed differences in the perceived level of trustworthiness among different groups of 
people may be important for our understanding of discrimination, including labor market 
discrimination.    
This paper does not deal with ethnicity, race, or religion per se. Rather, we are 
interested in the broader underlying issue of whether it is true that we consider people who are 
more similar to ourselves to be more trustworthy, ceteris paribus. The answer from this study 
is Yes. We asked people to judge the extent to which different groups of people are considered 
trustworthy in seven dimensions, of which some are not often investigated such as whether 
people read books or not or whether they live in small or big cities. We found a significant 
                                               
2
 The term social distance is here used broadly in the same way as it is defined in the Encyclopedia of 
Psychology (2000): “The perceived distance between individuals and groups.”  
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effect of similarity on perceived trustworthiness in each of the dimensions analyzed. Thus, it 
seems that perceived trustworthiness decreases quite generally with social distance. These 
results can be seen as examples of in-group bias, that is, that people belonging to the same 
group as oneself are evaluated and treated better than people outside the group. This is a 
phenomenon that psychologists such as Brewer (1979) have long observed, but that 
economists have only recently started to investigate (see Bernhard et al. 2006 and Goette et al. 
2006 for recent experimental evidence).   
Moreover, we also found some general differences between the perceived 
trustworthiness of people from different groups, particularly that older people are considered 
more trustworthy than younger and that people living in small cities are considered more 
trustworthy than people living in big cities. The reminder of this paper is organized as 
follows: The survey design and descriptive results are presented in Section 2, whereas Section 
3 presents econometric results, and Section 4 discusses the implications of the results (in 
particular in terms of discrimination) and concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Survey and Results 
The survey was mailed to 1,400 randomly selected adults above the age of 18 in Sweden 
during the spring of 2002. The response rate of the overall survey was 58%. Due to missing 
responses of the targeted questions, the number of observations included in the analysis is 
around 700, or about 50% of the total selected sample. The questionnaire consisted of an 
introductory text where the subjects were thanked for taking the time to answer our survey., 
followed by questions under six different headlines: i. Questions about wages and justice. ii. 
Which people are more trustworthy? iii. What is important in a friend? iv. Motives for voting. 
v. Questions about pensions. vi. Questions about you and your background. Thus, the 
trustworthiness question that concerns us came early in the questionnaire (this was the only 
Page 6 of 22
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 5 
question in the second section), whereas all background questions regarding political 
preferences, reading habits, age, and so on appeared in the last section. This is potentially 
important since if the order had been reversed, the reminder about their own characteristics 
could have influenced their subsequent responses on the trustworthiness question. The 
analyzed sample is fairly representative of the overall underlying sample of adults in Sweden; 
the last column of Table 3 provides mean values and standard deviations of the explanatory 
variables used. We have a slight over-representation of women and university-educated as 
well as middle-aged people. 
The interest in using survey methodology has increased recently not only within the 
trust and social capital literature, but also within many other fields of economics such as 
happiness research (e.g. Di Tella et al. 2001 and 2003, Luttmer 2005), concerns about relative 
income (e.g. Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002, Solnick and Hemenway 2005), wage setting in 
labor economics (e.g. Agell and Lundborg 2003, Agell 2004), and public economics (e.g. 
Fong 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005a). Despite this, a large share of economists (in 
contrast to many other social scientists) apparently remain skeptical to survey evidence 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). This may partly be explained by economists’ emphasis on 
monetary incentives; if people’s behaviors are assumed to be motivated solely by material 
incentives, it is indeed hard to understand why they would respond truthfully to survey 
questions.  
However, people are evidently motivated by many other factors, and some issues that 
we are intrinsically interested in are moreover difficult to analyze empirically with revealed 
preference methodologies. According to Sen (1973, p. 258), “We have been too prone, on the 
one hand, to overstate the difficulties of introspection and communication and, on the other, to 
underestimate the problems of studying preferences revealed by observed behavior.” Still, the 
skeptics do have good arguments, in particular when dealing with ethical issues where people 
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may overestimate the extent to which they would act ethically in real life (e.g. Kahneman and 
Knetsch 1992, Kahneman et al. 1999).  
<<Table 1 about here>> 
In our case one may expect that many people consider it more “honorable,” or that it 
reflects less prejudice and is certainly more politically correct, to believe that there are no 
differences among groups of people with respect to their trustworthiness. For this reason one 
may expect the observed trustworthiness differences from the survey responses to be biased 
downwards. Indeed, it turned out that as many as 21.6% considered both groups of people 
equally trustworthy in each of the seven comparisons. It appears reasonable that many of 
these could be seen as protest responses, and that they largely reflect unease with comparing 
the trustworthiness of groups of different people. Since this is not what we are interested in 
measuring, one could argue that we should drop these responses. On the other hand, some of 
them may reflect genuine judgments, so they are therefore kept in the analysis. The estimated 
differences in perceived trustworthiness can then be seen as conservative.     
In Table 1 there is nevertheless a clear tendency of people to consider those who are 
similar to themselves, in all dimensions analyzed, to be more trustworthy. For example, 
among rightwing voters3 more than 40% consider rightwing voters to be generally more 
trustworthy than Social Democratic voters and less than 2 % consider Social Democratic 
voters to be more trustworthy. The pattern is reversed when Social Democratic voters are 
asked. Here almost 60% consider Social Democratic voters to be more trustworthy than 
rightwing voters, whereas only about 0.5 % consider rightwing voters to be more trustworthy. 
In order to have a single measure that reflects relative trustworthiness, a simple balance 
measure is constructed as follows. Each response from left to right is coded as -2, -1, 0, +1 
                                               
3
 Rightwing voters refers to those in the survey who answered that if there were an election today, they would 
vote for Moderata Samlingspartiet. This is the most rightwing party in the Swedish parliament and is typically 
the second biggest party after the Social Democratic Party.      
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and +2. Then the mean value of the responses for each comparison is calculated. If, for 
example, all respondents would have marked the “Group 2 a bit more” alternative, then the 
balance measure would equal 1, whereas if everybody would have marked the “Equally 
much” alternative, then the measure would equal zero. Thus, the higher the balance measure, 
the more the comparison group 2 is trusted compared to group 1, and vice versa. For example, 
Social Democratic voters on average mark the box 0.54 steps to the right, whereas rightwing 
voters mark the box 0.7 steps to the left, implying a difference of 1.24 steps, which is clearly 
substantial.  
When comparing the balance measures of the compared sub-samples, we get the 
expected pattern in each of the comparisons considered. Respondents living in worker 
families consider industry workers to be more trustworthy than university educated people, 
whereas the opposite holds for university educated respondents. Similarly, respondents who 
are Christian believers consider Christian believers to be more trustworthy than convinced 
atheists, whereas the opposite holds for atheist respondents. There are less strong effects when 
comparing people with different reading habits and incomes, but the differences are in the 
expected, self-serving direction.4 We also see that both the young (below 30) and the old 
(above 45) believe that people around the age of 50 are more trustworthy than people around 
25, although the latter respondents think so to a larger extent. This can be compared to the 
recent finding by Holm and Nystedt (2005) that senders in trust games prefer receivers of a 
similar age as themselves when they can choose the receivers. In the light of the findings here, 
                                               
4
 ”Lives in a working class family” is one out of six alternatives that could be chosen for the question “If you 
would describe your household today, which of the following categories is the best description?”;  ”University 
educated” is one out of three alternatives that could be chosen for the question “Which is your highest school 
education?”;  “Convinced atheist” and “Christian believer” are two out of six alternatives that could be chosen 
for the question “Which outlook on life describes you best?”; “Every or almost every day” and “Never or very 
rarely” are the two extreme alternatives out of four alternatives regarding the question “How often do you read 
fiction, on average?”. The equivalent household income is calculated as follows: Total monthly household 
income is divided by (number of adults + 0.5×  number of children)0.75. 
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this may not be because people of the same generation are considered more trustworthy 
generally, but rather that they believe that the receivers will behave particularly trustworthy 
towards them.  
Are the respondents’ judgments that older people are more trustworthy on average 
correct? According to the findings by List (2004), they probably are. He found in a number of 
field experiments that the strength of non-selfish social preferences increases with age, 
corrected for other variables. Similarly, both people living in big cities and those not living in 
big cities believe that people living in small cities are more trustworthy, although the latter 
think so to a larger extent.5 Considering the criminal statistics in virtually all countries, this 
overall judgment seems quite reasonable too. In summary, we see that the respondents believe 
that people who are similar to themselves in all analyzed dimensions are considered relatively 
more trustworthy. Moreover, in Table 2 it is shown that most of those observed differences 
between the sub-samples are highly significant, based on non-parametric tests.  
<<Table 2 about here>> 
From the last row of Table 1 it follows that several times as many respondents believe 
that they themselves are more trustworthy than others, compared to those who believe the 
opposite. This is consistent with a large body of literature in psychology, showing that people 
systematically tend to overestimate their own abilities in various dimensions (see e.g. Taylor 
and Brown 1994 or Baumeister 1998 for overviews).  
 
3. Regression Analysis 
In Tables 3 and 4 we test whether the observed differences remain statistically significant 
when correcting for other explanatory variables. The overall pattern remains the same. For 
example, the -0.59 parameter associated with being a rightwing voter in the first column of 
                                               
5
 “Living in a big city” is defined as living in any of the three biggest cities in Sweden: Stockholm, Göteborg, or 
Malmö. 
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Table 3 implies that compared to others, rightwing voters mark the box 0.59 steps more to the 
left, on average. The difference between rightwing voters and Social Democratic voters is 
thus 0.59+0.58 steps (i.e. 1.17 steps), which is not only statistically significant, but also 
substantial. People who live in a working class family also trust Social Democrats more, 
which is not surprising since this has traditionally been the largest “worker party” in Sweden. 
We also see that Christians, on average, trust Social Democrats less, which may be explained 
by the fact that this party has a history of being quite explicitly against the church (as have 
many other socialist and left parties all over the world).  
<<Table 3 about here>> 
When comparing the trustworthiness of the university educated and industry workers, 
we have in addition to the expected effect of living in a working class family and university 
education that rightwing voters trust the university educated more. This is also quite logical 
since rightwing voters presumably tend to believe more in personal ambitions and outcome 
differences to a larger extent reflecting individual effort (cf. Alesina and La Ferrara 2005a, 
Benabou and Tirole 2006a). It is interesting though that this effect quantitatively is almost as 
large as the sum of the university education and “working class family” effects.  
Moving to the next column, we see that the effects with respect to respondent age are 
the expected ones. Those aged between 40 and 60 consider people aged 50 to be significantly 
more trustworthy than 25 year olds, and the same applies to an even larger extent for 
respondents older than 60. Both Social Democratic and rightwing voters consider 50 year olds 
to be more trustworthy than 25 year olds, whereas the opposite holds for female respondents.6 
                                               
6
 Both of these parties can be seen as conservative, albeit in different ways. The rightwing party is ideologically 
conservative, and part of this implies that one should show respect for older people. The Social Democratic Party 
has been in power for 64 out of the last 75 years in Sweden and is conservative in the sense that it wants to 
preserve many of the current institutions and social structures. Moreover, the generation that built up much of 
these institutions in Sweden is currently old. A possible explanation behind the female effect is that since gender 
equality has increased over time, younger men may be considered more trustworthy than older men. 
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Those who live in big cities consider other people who live in big cities to be relatively more 
trustworthy. The only other significant effect is that women consider people who live in big 
cities to be more trustworthy.7 The difference between how Christians and atheists judge the 
relative trustworthiness between Christians and atheists is 0.57+0.7=1.27 steps, which is a 
huge difference. Both rightwing voters and older respondents consider Christians to be more 
trustworthy, possibly reflecting value conservatism. On the other hand we have that a higher 
income implies that atheists are considered more trustworthy, perhaps reflecting that the 
morality of gift-giving (in particular by the rich) emphasized in Christianity is less popular 
among the rich.  
We also have substantial effects on the relative trustworthiness of people with 
different reading habits: those who read fiction more often also consider others who read 
often to be more trustworthy and vice versa. Rightwing voters and Christians consider book 
readers more trustworthy, where the latter may reflect that reading edifying books, and the 
Bible in particular, is essential to many Christians. Respondents with higher incomes consider 
others with high incomes more trustworthy, as do rightwing and university educated 
respondents. The latter may partly reflect a self-serving judgement since university studies on 
average imply a steeper wage rofile over time, implying that they expect a higher future 
income.  
We see very little systematic variation in the extent to which people believe that they 
themselves are more trustworthy than others. The only significant effect at the 5 % level is 
that those who never or rarely read books to a lower extent believe that they are more 
trustworthy than others. Of course, we cannot say from this study whether this reflects a real 
difference or not. However, it appears reasonable that it might, since reading books to some 
                                               
7
 Perhaps this reflects that the stronger social control in smaller cities and in the countryside to a larger extent has 
reduced the liberty of women compared to men. This is also consistent with the pattern that women to a larger 
extent than men are moving from the countryside to bigger cities. 
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extent is related to the ability of overcoming self-control problems, and being trustworthy is 
presumably to a certain degree also about self-control.  
<<Table 4 about here>> 
The pattern from Table 4, which presents ordered probit instead of OLS estimates, is 
almost identical to the one in Table 3 with respect to statistical significance. Overall, the basic 
pattern is clear also from the regression analysis: people who are perceived as being similar 
are considered to be more trustworthy by the respondents.   
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has presented clear survey-based evidence that people consider others who are 
similar to themselves, in what seems to be almost any dimension, to generally be more 
trustworthy. This appears to be a potentially important reason behind discrimination, and 
possibly also behind more general economic consequences such as variations in growth rates 
among countries.  
The economics discrimination literature has largely focused on two kinds of 
discrimination: taste-based discrimination (TD), where some people are treated worse than 
others simply because the discriminators have a preference for doing so (Becker 1957), and 
statistical discrimination (SD), where some people under imperfect information are treated 
worse because they belong to a group whose people on average have a less favorable 
characteristic (Phelps 1972, Arrow, 1973); hence, unlike a situation with TD, they are treated 
worse because it is profitable to treat them worse. The results in this paper suggest a third 
kind of discrimination, which we ma denote biased perception based discrimination (BPD). 
In BPD, some people are treated worse because they belong to a group that others erroneously 
believe have a less favorable characteristic on average, for example that people in this group 
are less trustworthy on average. Moreover, if people systematically believe that people who 
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are similar to themselves have more favorable characteristics, as is found in this paper, then a 
consequence is that minorities will be treated worse simply because people belonging to a 
minority have fewer people who are similar to them.  
It is also possible that such discrimination may be amplified by other social 
mechanisms. For example, by letting young boys of high and low castes in India solve mazes, 
Hoff and Pandey (2006) investigated experimentally how discrimination may cause 
stereotypes that in turn affect individual behavior. In the anonymous treatment, no significant 
caste difference was obtained. However, when names and castes were publicly revealed, a 
significant caste gap emerged due to a large decline in the average number of mazes solved by 
the low caste. Thus, subjects in the discriminated group started to perform worse. In this way 
BPD (or for that matter TD) may induce SD, and since SD is rational and not based on any 
preferences for discrimination or perception bias, it may be very difficult to change the 
discriminatory pattern. Also, a rather minor degree of BPD may then cause large and 
prevailing negative social consequences.   
The results here may also contribute to our understanding of the reason behind the 
empirical finding that higher ethnic diversity is typically associated with lower provision of 
public goods (e.g. Alesina et al. 1999, Alesina and LaFerrara 2002 and 2005b. Easterly and 
Levine 1997). The reasons behind this finding, which in itself appears widely accepted, is less 
well understood, or at least not agreed upon in the literature. Clearly, public good provision 
requires an element of cooperation and trust (see e.g. Seabright), which in turn requires that 
others are considered reasonably trustworthy. Now, if others are considered less trustworthy if 
they are less similar to oneself, as is found in this paper, one would suspect that a larger 
degree of ethnic diversity would indeed reduce the provision of public goods.  
Of course, the methodology used here for measuring differences in perceived 
trustworthiness among groups of people is not without problems, but on the other hand this 
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applies to all known methods that are used for this purpose. In such a situation, 
methodological pluralism is valuable in order to test the robustness of the findings, and survey 
methodology should therefore primarily be seen as a complement rather than a substitute for 
other methods (e.g. ones that rely on monetary incentives and revealed behavior).   
Finally, although beyond the main task of this paper, we may speculate about the 
reason behind the observed pattern. There are several possible explanations (e.g. based on 
evolutionary selection), and psychologists have proposed different explanations to the more 
general phenomenon of in-group bias. Let us just consider a single one that is consistent with 
the data: social identity theory. Tajfel (1981, p. 255) defines social identity as “the 
individuals’ knowledge that they belong to certain social groups together with some 
emotional and value significance to them of their group membership.” According to social 
identity theory, one important reason why people display in-group bias is that it enhances 
social identity, thereby elevating the self-esteem or self-image of group members (e.g. Tajfel 
and Turner 1986).8 A testable implication of this theory is that we should observe larger in-
group bias in dimensions that are more important for our social identity. This is also what we 
found. The quantitatively largest effects are between Christians and atheists and between 
Social Democratic and rightwing voters. Both of these dimensions are presumably very 
important in many people’s perception of their social identity and for their self-image (cf. 
Akerlof and Kranton 2000 and 2002).  
Another implication of the theory is that we bias our perception of ourselves versus 
others in a self-serving way,9 and the results here also indicate that we are, on average, quite 
                                               
8
 A related reason is self-signaling, which has received much attention within economics recently (e.g. Benabou 
and Tirole 2002, 2004, and 2006b). In a world where our self-knowledge is imperfect and where we prefer to 
have a positive self-image, we may consider people who are similar to ourselves as more trustworthy simply 
because by doing so we signal to ourselves that we are more trustworthy than others. 
9
 This is also consistent with self-enhancement more generally (see e.g. Taylor and Brown 1994 or Baumeister 
1998). 
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successful in maintaining that we are indeed more trustworthy than others. Apparently we like 
that. 
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Table 1. Perceived relative trustworthiness between groups of people as responses to the following question: Some people seem to be more 
trustworthy. They are honest and do not try to cheat on others. Now we want to know which people you consider to be more trustworthy, on 
average. If you think that people in the left group are much more trustworthy, you mark the box to the far left, and vice versa. If you believe that 
they are somewhat more trustworthy, you mark the second box from the left, and vice versa. Use the middle alternative only when you think that 
there is no difference between the groups. No answers are “right” or “wrong”; we are interested in your sincere judgment. * 
Sample n Comparison group 1 Group 
1 much 
more  
Group 
1 a bit  
more 
Equally 
much 
Group 
2 a bit  
more 
Group 
2 much 
more 
Comparison group 2 Balance 
measure** 
All 701 Rightwing party voters 3.6% 9.3% 61.2% 20.8% 5.1% Social Democratic voters + 0.15 
Rightwing party voters 130 Rightwing party voters 14.6% 26.9% 56.8% 0.8% 0.8% Social Democratic voters - 0.54 
Social Democratic voters 191 Rightwing party voters 0.0% 0.5% 41.9% 45.0% 12.6% Social Democratic voters + 0.70 
All 703 Industry workers 6.0% 12.8% 68.1% 10.8% 2.3% University educated - 0.09 
Lives in a “working class family” 253 Industry workers 10.7% 16.6% 66.0% 4.7% 2.0% University educated - 0.29 
University educated  269 Industry workers 0.4% 7.1% 74.7% 15.6% 2.2% University educated + 0.12 
All 705 People around age 25 1.0% 3.0% 55.6% 31.4% 9.1% People around age 50 + 0.45 
People aged 30 or below 149 People around age 25 0.7% 7.4% 59.1% 26.9% 6.0% People around age 50 + 0.30 
People aged 45 or above 556 People around age 25 1.4% 1.1% 50.9% 34.3% 12.3% People around age 50 + 0.55 
All 700 People living in big cities 1.3% 4.0% 55.0% 29.7% 10.0% People living in a small city + 0.43 
People living in a big city 180 People living in big cities 3.3% 3.9% 61.1% 28.3% 3.3% People living in a small city + 0.24 
People not living in a big city 520 People living in big cities 0.6% 4.0% 52.9% 30.2% 12.3% People living in a small city + 0.50 
All 700 Christian believers 5.9% 17.0% 63.9% 9.7% 3.6% Convinced atheists - 0.12 
Christian believers 96 Christian believers 21.9% 28.1% 49.0% 1.0% 0.0% Convinced atheists - 0.71 
Convinced atheists 59 Christian believers 0.0% 1.7% 50.8% 28.8% 18.6% Convinced atheists + 0.64 
All 692 People that read fiction each day 3.0% 14.6% 78.2% 3.6% 0.6% People who never read fiction - 0.16 
People who  read fiction every or 
almost every day 
151 People that read fiction each day 6.0% 24.5% 68.2% 1.3% 0.0% People who never read fiction - 0.35 
People that never or rarely read 
fiction 
210 People that read fiction each day 1.4% 6.2% 84.3% 7.1% 0.9% People who never read fiction 0.00 
All 698 Low income people 5.2% 16.1% 70.1% 8.2% 0.6% High income people - 0.17 
Eq. household income per capita 
less than 7,500 SEK/month 
164 Low income people 6.7% 20.7% 67.1% 4.3% 1.2% High income people - 0.27 
Eq. household income per capita 
more than 15,000 SEK/month 
176 Low income people 4.5% 8.0% 74.4% 12.5% 0.6% High income people - 0.03 
All  Yourself 28.1% 26.6% 41.9% 1.6% 1.8% People in general - 0.78 
*   The respondents got this question word for word, and they had thus eight pairwise comparisons to make. Between the alternative to the left and the one to the right 
there were five boxes, where they were to mark one box on each row. They were not given any of the additional information in the table.  
**
 Constructed as the mean value of the responses where each response from left to right is coded as -2, -1, 0, +1, +2. Thus, the higher the balance measure, the more 
comparison group 2 is trusted compared to group 1, and vice versa. 
Page 20 of 22
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 19 
Table 2. Wilcoxon and Mann-Whitney rank test (WMW) and Kruskal-Wallis test (KW) of 
differences in the underlying distributions between sub-samples, with respect to differences in 
perceived trustworthiness between people of different groups. 
 
Tests of equal underlying distributions between the samples:  Test P-value 
Perceived relative trustworthiness between Rightwing party voters and Social Democratic voters 
Rightwing party voters and Social Democratic voters WMW 0.000 
Rightwing party voters and other voters (neither rightwing nor Social Democratic) WMW 0.000 
Social Democratic voters and other voters WMW 0.000 
Rightwing party voters, Social Democratic voters and other voters KW 0.000 
Perceived relative trustworthiness between Industry workers and University educated 
Low educated and University educated WMW 0.000 
Low educated and Neither low nor university educated WMW 0.022 
University educated and All WMW 0.000 
Lives in a “working class family”, University educated and All KW 0.243 
Perceived relative trustworthiness between People around age 25and People around age 50 
People aged 30 or below and People aged 45 or above WMW 0.000 
People aged 30 or below and People between 30 and 45 WMW 0.288 
People aged 45 or above and All WMW 0.004 
People aged 30 or below, People aged 45 or above and All KW 0.000 
Perceived relative trustworthiness between People living in big cities and People living in small cities 
People living in big cities and People not living in big cities WMW 0.001 
Perceived relative trustworthiness between Christian believers and Convinced atheists 
Christian believers and Convinced atheists WMW 0.000 
Christian believers and All WMW 0.000 
Convinced atheists and All WMW 0.000 
Christian believers, Convinced atheists and All KW 0.000 
Perceived relative trustworthiness between People who read fiction each day and People who never read fiction 
People who read fiction every or almost every day and People who never or rarely read 
fiction 
WMW 0.000 
People who read fiction every or almost every day and All WMW 0.001 
People who never or rarely read fiction and All WMW 0.000 
People who read fiction every or almost every day, People who never or rarely read 
fiction and All 
KW 0.000 
Perceived relative trustworthiness between Low income people and High income people 
Eq. household income per capita < 7,500 SEK/month and Eq. household income per 
capita > 15,000 SEK/month 
WMW 0.000 
Eq. household income per capita < 7,500 SEK/month and All WMW 0.113 
Eq. household income per capita > 15,000 SEK/month and All WMW 0.001 
Eq. household income per capita < 7,500 SEK/month, Eq. household income per capita > 
15,000 SEK/month and All 
KW 0.000 
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Table 3. OLS regressions of perceived relative trustworthiness between groups of people. t-values in parentheses.  
 Perceived trustworthiness of… 
 Social 
Democratic 
voters relative to 
Rightwing 
voters  
University 
educated 
relative to 
Industry 
workers   
People around 
age 50 relative 
to people 
around age 25 
People living 
in small cities 
relative to 
people living 
in big cities 
Convinced 
atheists 
relative to 
Christian 
believers  
People who never 
read fiction 
relative to people 
who read fiction 
each day 
High income 
people 
relative to 
Low income 
people  
People in 
general 
relative to 
Yourself 
Mean value 
of the 
explanatory 
variables 
Intercept 
 
2.03*** 
(22.34) 
1.85*** 
(19.40) 
2.26*** 
(23.11) 
2.55***  
(24.21) 
1.79*** 
(18.1) 
1.84*** 
(25.53) 
1.68*** 
(19.40) 
1.14*** 
(9.0) 
 
Rightwing party 
voter 
-0.59***  
(-8.25) 
0.34*** 
(4.55) 
0.27*** 
(3.51) 
-0.12 
(-1.49) 
-0.17** 
(-2.19) 
-0.19*** 
(-3.46) 
0.31*** 
(4.46) 
0.13 
(1.29) 
0.19 
Social 
Democratic voter 
0.58*** 
(9.68) 
-0.070 
(-1.10) 
0.12* 
(1.93) 
0.054 
(0.78) 
0.033 
(0.50) 
-0.029 
(-0.61) 
0.068 
(1.12) 
-0.072 
(-0.87) 
0.28 
Lives in a 
“working class 
family” 
0.12** 
(2.01) 
-0.12*  
(-1.95) 
0.026 
(0.42) 
-0.014 
(-0.021) 
0.029 
(0.45) 
0.047 
(1.03) 
-0.092 
(-1.63) 
0.007 
(0.091) 
0.37 
University 
educated 
0.075 
(1.26) 
0.26*** 
(4.15) 
-0.088 
(-1.40) 
-0.11 
(-1.56) 
-0.085 
(-1.32) 
-0.022 
(-0.47) 
0.15*** 
(2.65) 
0.075 
(0.92) 
0.38 
Aged between 40 
and 60 
0.029 
(0.52) 
-0.076 
(-1.30) 
0.21*** 
(3.65) 
0.042 
(0.66) 
-0.039 
(-0.64) 
-0.041 
(-0.95) 
-0.066 
(-1.24) 
0.13* 
(1.69) 
0.50 
Aged 60.1 or 
above 
-0.007 
(-0.08) 
-0.0002 
(-0.002) 
0.31*** 
(3.21) 
0.17 
(1.61) 
-0.25** 
(-2.53) 
-0.082 
(-1.14) 
-0.14 
(-1.56) 
0.10 
(0.83) 
0.11 
Living in a big 
city 
-0.026 
(-0.43) 
-0.088 
(-1.34) 
0.060 
(0.91) 
-0.20*** 
(-2.83) 
0.0060 
(0.089) 
-0.081* 
(-1.66) 
-0.049 
(-0.83) 
-0.044 
(-0.52) 
0.26 
Christian believer 
 
-0.17** 
(-2.21) 
0.091 
(1.13) 
0.18** 
(2.24) 
0.030 
(0.34) 
-0.57*** 
(-6.96) 
-0.16*** 
(-2.59) 
0.019 
(0.26) 
0.053 
(0.50) 
0.13 
Convinced atheist 
 
-0.020 
(-0.21) 
-0.056 
(-0.57) 
-0.029 
(-0.30) 
-0.022 
(-0.21) 
0.70*** 
(6.90) 
0.026 
(0.36) 
-0.11 
(-1.26) 
0.093 
(0.71) 
0.08 
Reads fiction 
every or almost 
every day 
-0.0007 
(-0.01) 
-0.048 
(-0.68) 
-0.12 
(-1.64) 
-0.010 
(-0.13) 
0.12* 
(1.68) 
-0.20*** 
(-3.78) 
0.0053 
(0.084) 
0.094 
(1.02) 
0.22 
Never reads 
fiction 
0.006 
(0.09) 
-0.091 
(-1.38) 
0.035 
(0.53) 
0.068 
(0.94) 
-0.012 
(-0.18) 
0.15*** 
(3.11) 
-0.070 
(-1.12) 
-0.19** 
(-2.16) 
0.30 
Eq. household 
income per capita 
-0.034 
(-0.74) 
0.016 
(0.33) 
0.030 
(0.62) 
0.0022 
(0.042) 
0.12** 
(2.51) 
0.058 
(1.63) 
0.098** 
(2.25) 
0.028 
(0.44) 
1.21 (10,000 
SEK/month) 
Female 
 
0.083 
(1.51) 
0.059 
(1.02) 
-0.13** 
(-2.22) 
-0.15** 
(-2.36) 
0.050 
(0.83) 
0.067 
(1.55) 
0.025 
(0.48) 
-0.050 
(-0.66) 
0.53 
R2 0.291 0.113 0.081 0.051 0.175 0.096 0.087 0.027  
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Table 4. Ordered probit regressions of perceived relative trustworthiness between groups of people. t-values in parentheses.  
 Perceived trustworthiness of… 
 Social 
Democratic 
voters relative to 
Rightwing 
voters  
University 
educated 
relative to 
Industry 
workers   
People around 
age 50 relative 
to people 
around age 25 
People living 
in small cities 
relative to 
people living 
in big cities 
Convinced 
atheists 
relative to 
Christian 
believers  
People who never 
read fiction 
relative to people 
who read fiction 
each day 
High income 
people 
relative to 
Low income 
people  
People in 
general 
relative to 
Yourself 
Intercept 
 
2.14*** 
(12.95) 
1.63*** 
(10.13) 
2.20** 
(13.68) 
2.45***  
(15.72) 
1.60*** 
(10.0) 
1.97*** 
(10.11) 
1.47*** 
(8.77) 
0.48*** 
(3.2) 
Rightwing party 
voter 
-1.08***  
(-8.46) 
0.60*** 
(4.78) 
0.43*** 
(3.57) 
-0.18 
(-1.52) 
-0.25** 
(-2.09) 
-0.43*** 
(-3.19) 
0.62*** 
(4.74) 
0.15 
(1.32) 
Social 
Democratic voter 
1.05*** 
(9.79) 
-0.13 
(-1.26) 
0.21** 
(2.02) 
0.067 
(0.67) 
0.063 
(0.61) 
-0.061 
(-0.52) 
0.12 
(1.16) 
-0.081 
(-0.83) 
Working class 
family 
0.20* 
(1.95) 
-0.21**  
(-2.07) 
0.035 
(0.35) 
-0.0091 
(-0.094) 
0.034 
(0.34) 
0.13 
(1.13) 
-0.18* 
(-1.77) 
0.0007 
(0.007) 
University 
educated 
0.12 
(1.17) 
0.43*** 
(4.15) 
-0.15 
(-1.51) 
-0.15 
(-1.56) 
-0.13 
(-1.29) 
-0.074 
(-0.64) 
0.27*** 
(2.57) 
0.090 
(0.93) 
Aged between 40 
and 60 
0.054 
(0.57) 
-0.14 
(-1.45) 
0.36*** 
(3.82) 
0.075 
(0.81) 
-0.035 
(-0.37) 
-0.093 
(-0.85) 
-0.12 
(-1.23) 
0.16* 
(1.73) 
Aged 60.1 or 
above 
-0.018 
(-0.12) 
-0.00042 
(-0.003) 
0.50*** 
(3.26) 
0.25* 
(1.67) 
-0.36** 
(-2.36) 
-0.13 
(-0.71) 
-0.23 
(-1.41) 
0.11 
(0.72) 
Living in a big 
city 
-0.021 
(-0.20) 
-0.12 
(-1.16) 
0.097 
(0.93) 
-0.28*** 
(-2.68) 
0.0046 
(0.044) 
-0.18 
(-1.53) 
-0.091 
(-0.83) 
-0.054 
(-0.53) 
Christian believer 
 
-0.27** 
(-2.08) 
0.16 
(1.25) 
0.28** 
(2.19) 
0.039 
(0.30) 
-0.88*** 
(-6.85) 
-0.37** 
(-2.53) 
0.058 
(0.43) 
0.080 
(0.64) 
Convinced atheist 
 
-0.034 
(-0.20) 
-0.056 
(-0.34) 
-0.047 
(-0.30) 
-0.019 
(-0.12) 
1.10*** 
(6.87) 
0.062 
(0.33) 
-0.22 
(-1.35) 
0.10 
(0.65) 
Reads fiction 
every or almost 
every day 
-0.016 
(-0.14) 
-0.064 
(-0.55) 
-0.19 
(-1.65) 
-0.028 
(-0.25) 
0.21* 
(1.84) 
-0.44*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.002 
(-0.016) 
0.11 
(1.04) 
Never reads 
fiction 
0.008 
(0.07) 
-0.13 
(-1.12) 
0.052 
(0.49) 
0.081 
(0.78) 
-0.0067 
(-0.06) 
0.46*** 
(3.59) 
-0.12 
(-1.12) 
-0.22** 
(-2.15) 
Eq. household 
income per capita 
-0.075 
(-0.95) 
0.023 
(0.24) 
0.044 
(0.58) 
-0.00093 
(-0.012) 
0.19** 
(2.43) 
0.15* 
(1.73) 
0.20** 
(2.46) 
0.032 
(0.43) 
Female 
 
0.13 
(1.37) 
0.088 
(0.93) 
-0.21** 
(-2.28) 
-0.23*** 
(-2.48) 
0.080 
(0.86) 
0.16 
(1.49) 
0.032 
(0.33) 
-0.064 
(-0.72) 
Cut-off values 0.85 
3.15 
4.35 
0.76 
2.95 
3.89 
0.63 
2.75 
3.91 
0.62 
2.53 
3.59 
0.94 
3.01 
3.81 
1.04 
3.95 
4.77 
0.89 
3.23 
4.40 
0.70 
2.45 
2.73 
